The Political Institutions of Union Health Governance
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has often been pointed to as a major driver of healthcare integration. It has undoubtedly been a major force in the narration of European health law European Parliament respond in subsequent legislative processes, and which competences they grant agencies and committees to produce European standards and monitor national implementation practices.
Therefore to understand and explain the development of Union health law and policy it is necessary to analyse its governing institutions; the European Commission, the Council of the European Union 9 , the European Parliament as well as health agencies and networks.
The European Commission has the competence to propose Union legislation. In thus has a legislative function and formally initiates the policy process. However, the Commission is by no means a unitary actor but has its internal power conflicts in setting the policies for Europe. 10 Which part of the Commission proposes and executes health policies is important. Up to 1997, the Commission did not have a specific
Directorate General (DG) dealing with health. Instead healthcare was spread across different DGs and Commissioners, with a certain bias towards the internal market. Because of the BSE crisis, the DG for Food and Health safety (SANCO) was formed in 1997 and health thus became an independent portfolio under the Commission. However, DG SANCO has been characterized as politically weak 11 in comparison with other parts of the Commission. Nevertheless, it has gained increasing competences within the regulation of health as for example demonstrated when it took over the drafting of the patients' rights directive from the DG MARKT (Internal Market). As will be further detailed below, SANCO became lead DG after the European Parliament voted to negotiate cross-border healthcare as part of the service directive. arguing and bargaining and thus for gradually forming the compromise, establishing the common position between member states. 13 Also the rotating Council presidency is important in this regard. 14 The civil servants representing the presidency will chair the negotiations in the working group and conduct informal talks and bilateral negotiations with his counterparts when need be.
The European Parliament (EP) has increased its powers as co-legislator, also in the field of health policy.
However, its institutional impact on health legislation is rather unexplored. To have influence on the adopted policies, the intra-institutional dynamics within the parliament as well as its inter-institutional relation with the Council and the Commission are important for the EP. Intra-institutional dynamics will be conditioned by the EP political majority but also by which political group holds rapporteurship on a dossier as well as the internal dynamics in the EP committee preparing the file. In health, the EP Committee on Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety (ENVI) will typically be responsible for the dossier. It will, however, also have to consider proposed amendments from other relevant committees in its final report.
For health, the EP committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and the committee for the Internal Market (IMCO) are of particular relevance. In the ordinary legislative procedure, the decision-making process will be that when the Commission has come forward with its proposal, the proposal is referred to the responsible EP committee and often to one or more committees for their opinion. 15 The next step is then to nominate a rapporteur within the committee. It is the rapporteur's task to prepare discussions on the dossier in the committee, to present a draft report and to amend it on the basis of the observations of committee members. The committee will then vote on the final report of the rapporteur. Subsequently the rapporteur will present the report to the EP plenary and its vote will be cast. The rapporteur will also be the primary negotiator with the Council presidency to establish an inter-institutional compromise and finally have the legislative text adopted. The position and parliamentary capacity of the rapporteur is therefore highly important. Rapportuership is prestigious, especially on the more important dossiers. Committees chose rapporteurs on the basis of a system of points. Each political group has a quota of points according to their size and they can then opt for proposals where they would like rapportuership on. Thus the larger groups therefore gets rapportuership on the more important proposals, typically making their bids here.
The political groups not getting the rapportuership will nominate shadowrapportuers who will then negotiate with the rapportuer. The shadowrapportuers from the larger political groups will all take part in negotiations with the Council and the European Commissions, in the so-called trialogues. industry has been more successful in influencing the technical harmonization than patients' organisations and interests. EU regulation hereof is found to lack policy advocacy. 22 Together, these institutions form the governing structure for the health policies of the European Union. In the subsequent sections, the legislative politics behind the adoption of the patient rights directive in 2011 will be examined. Furthermore it will be demonstrated how the output of legislative politics condition subsequent outcomes, i.e. implementation results.
Legislating the EU Patients' Rights Directive 23
The importance of EU legislative politics appears to be somewhat neglected in the study of EU health governance. The literature has mainly emphasised the importance of EU law and the CJEU, or examined the role of the Commission in EU health regulation. However, extending EU competences into health policy and law is a process ripe with political conflicts, as the negotiations of the patients' rights directive demonstrate. In this process, four institutions; the CJEU, the Commission, the Council and the EP, and a wide array of actors took center stage.
Agenda-setting patients' rights in cross-border healthcare
The right to access healthcare in another member state was adopted between the original member states as one of the first Community regulations which granted migrant workers the right to have their social security rights, including healthcare, coordinated across borders. From first on, it was politically adopted to achieve the aims of a common market, albeit in the politically setting of the original six member states.
Concerning healthcare, member states maintained considerable control of patients seeking planned health treatment in another member state. According to regulation 1408/71 and later 883/2004 such had to be authorized beforehand from the competent institution of the migrant, typically the home member state. the competent authority's discretionary scope to grant or refuse cross-border healthcare was considerable indeed and de facto by most member states seldom granted. 24 The prior authorization policy of secondary legislation thus affirmed the territoriality of health policy and law. However, the justifiability of territoriality was challenged by the line of CJEU judicial interpretations where the Court 25 laid down that also the principles of free movement of goods and services applied to the field of healthcare. Jurisprudence was thus an important push for further health policy integration, challenging national control. The interesting question becomes if legislative politics had the capacity and willingness to respond to this legal push for integration?
The first political reactions to the CJEU jurisprudence were harsh, finding that the Court had taken it too far.
First a Treaty amendment was called for. 26 When that was deemed impossible, the member states called for the Commission to re-establish legal certainty.
The Commission first responded to this call by 'deafening silence'. 27 DG MARKT was then assigned hospital treatments defined as highly specialized and cost-intensive, PA would be justifiable as well as PA could be used for hospital care. However, hospital care, highly specialized and cost-intensive care should rely on a Community definition. 31 If member states could not provide treatment without 'undue delay', they would be obliged to authorize cross-border healthcare.
Although SANCO had hereby extended the use of PA, it at the same time restrained its use. Highly specialized and cost-intensive care should be included on a specific list, under the control of the Commission and regulated by the Comitology procedure. Furthermore, member states should prove that PA was necessary by providing evidence that outflow of patients would 'seriously undermine or [was] likely to seriously undermine' the financial balance, planning, or rationalization of the hospital sector. 32 The member states' burden of proof when using the PA procedure was thus considerable.
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With this modification of the previous Commission position, negotiations on the proposal initiated in the EP and the Council.
Political negotiations in the European Parliament
During political negotiations, positions in the EP and the Council were split on especially two conflict lines.
An ideological conflict dimension between left and right along which different positions on equality emerged. Political actors disagreed on how much the directive should aim to ensure equality in patients' ability to use cross-border healthcare. In addition, a conflict dimension on more versus less European integration was vivid throughout negotiations. Political actors and the Commission disagreed on the scope conditions of internal market principles versus the justifiability of national control with the provision of healthcare services, i.e. more integration versus subsidiarity.
In order to establish the necessary majority in the EP, a compromise had to be reached between the three largest political groups; the conservative European People's Party (EPP), the liberals (ALDE) and the was important to work for the greatest possible equality in patients' ability to exercise their cross-border rights. ALDE therefore proposed a European patient ombudsman to which patients could complain.
Socialists and Democrats (S&D
Furthermore, ALDE had preferred a stronger application of free movement principles than the Commission proposed. On the other hand, the S&D political group were much more critical towards the dossier. In addition, the group disagreed internally on the proposal. The German MEP Dagmar Roth-Behrendt became the S&D shadowrapportuer on the file, and her individual position was more in favour of the proposal than the S&D 'back-benchers'. The common position of the group became that the Treaty basis of the proposal had to be changed into also including TFEU 168 and not only be based on the internal market provision 114 TFEU. Furthermore, S&D worked for more national autonomy on when to grant prior authorization.
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The first reading of the proposal took place six months before the 2009 EP election. In the heat of elections, MEPs appeared less willing to compromise and it was difficult for the rapporteur to establish a compromise between the different positions. No less than 1600 amendments were submitted to the proposal, but the final Bowis rapport had managed to merge them into 100. A total of 115 amendments were adopted during the first reading. The adopted EP amendments would imply more national control by extending the scope of when the prior authorisation procedure could be used for which type of care. Furthermore, the EP majority position aimed to strengthen patients' rights and ensure equality. A new article had been adopted which would allow patients with rare diseases to go for cross-border care without prior authorization (article 8.9). Concerning equality, the EP added a voucher system according to which a patient could receive a voucher from their competent state authorizing cross-border care and certifying that the treatment would be paid by them (article 10). This provision aimed to enhance equal rights, independent of means:
"When we say the policy should be about patients with needs, not patients with means, we should make it clear we do not wish to see patients having to travel, clutching cash or credit card to pay upfront for often expensive in-hospital treatment. We should put in place a system of reimbursement direct from home funder to receiving hospital, either through a Central Clearing House to manage the cross-border, crosscurrency, cross-system (Beveridge/Bismarck) complications, or by a bi-lateral voucher system for the patient to take to the hospital and guaranteeing the latter payment by the Member State of Affiliation".
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Finally, the EP inserted a new article 11, which would establish a European patient ombudsman, whose tasks would be to deal with patients' complaints on prior authorization, reimbursement, or harm. 
Political Negotiations in the Council
The Council working group kicked of negotiations by being indeed internally divided, and with only two or three member states supporting the Commission's proposal. For the first year, the positions were largely divided into three groups. Sweden and Belgium supported the proposal. A second group of more reluctant member states, which were, however, willing to negotiate, counted the UK, the Netherlands, France, Germany and Denmark among others. Finally a large third group of Southern and Eastern European Council members opposed the dossier and found it a wronged intervention in national competences. The different positions seemed indeed informed by the degree to which CJEU case-law had been implemented in the respective member states.
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The list of member states' concerns was long. The majority of member states were against the Commission's proposal of a Community definitions of 'hospital care', 'highly specialized and cost-intensive care', which according to the proposal should be put on a Community list, controlled and regularly updated by the Commission. The opposing member states argued that this would not allow them sufficient control, and in fact endanger the sustainability and steering capacity of national healthcare systems. Many member states also voiced concerns about inflow of patients and the obligation to treat them equally with national patients. How to deal with inflow of patients was not addressed in the Commission's proposal, except that patients from other member states should enjoy equal treatment. Furthermore, a number of member states wanted to extend the legal basis of the proposal to also include 168 TFEU. In addition, concerns were raised about the general practioner (GP) as gate-keeper if patients could consult a GP in another member state and here through be referred for further treatment. Also many member states were against to have to reimburse healthcare, which was provided by a non-contracted provider in another member state. The position was that this would be indirect discrimination as those seeking cross-border healthcare would be able to access treatment by a non-contracted, i.e. a private, provider whereas those staying home would not. This group of member state argued that the directive should be similar to Regulation 883/2004, which only allowed for treatment by providers contracted by the member state of treatment.
During negotiations in the Council, the rotating presidencies formulated compromise texts. SANCO took part in working group negotiations as well as in bilateral meetings with the presidencies and individual member states. However, the Commission found that negotiations were taking a wrong turn, in particular when it came to the national focus on extending the use of the PA procedure. As here noted by the Czech presidency, the Commission found that such extension would be against the case-law of the Court:
"The Commission has a general reserve on the entire Presidency compromise text. In particular it has major concerns with regard to the approach on quality and safety as provided for in Article 5; the approach on prior authorisation which in the Commission's view does not reflect the case law, including the definition of care that can be subject to prior authorisation, which has been significantly broadened" (Czech presidency clarification. Also the burden of proof that member states would have to carry when using PA had been relaxed. 44 Thus, concerning the outflow of patients, MS had re-established considerable national control.
Moreover, the inflow of patients was now also considered in a binding provision of the directive. The
Council had insisted that member states of treatment could derogate from the principle of equal treatment if need be, and a new safeguard measure had been adopted by means of article 4.3, allowing member states the possibility 'to fence off their healthcare markets'.
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Rare diseases
No recitals or articles deal herewith Recital and article 13, but no binding measures
Conclusion -How legislative Output Condition Outcomes
The governing institutions of EU health policy and law consist of a considerable mix of actors and institutions, with different positions and interests on what should be the balance between supranational and national competences in Union healthcare regulation. In the studies of EU healthcare regulation, most importance has been assigned to the actions and dynamics of the European Court and the Commission.
However, politics should be brought in if we are to understand how legislative outputs are produced and the scope and limits of EU health regulation are set. Outputs which then come to condition the subsequent outcomes of regulation.
The patients' rights directive constitutes the output of EU legislative politics analysed above. The output matters to who benefits from the directive and to what extent. As to the conflict dimensions entailed in the political process, it is clear that the directive does not ensure equality as voiced by political actors to the left. Furthermore extensive national control was achieved, meaning less integration than envisioned by the Commission, few member states, the EPP and ALDE. Majoritarian politics adopted five key provisions, which in essence disincentivize patients from seeking healthcare in another member state:
 The patient can only access treatment which s/he is already entitled to at home.
 The patient will be reimbursed only up to the tariff for a similar treatment at home. In particular,
patients from member states with low reimbursement levels will be less able to be treated across borders.
 The patient will have to pay up front. Patients with small means will be less able to be treated across borders.
 The system of prior authorization is maintained for hospital care and highly specialized and costintensive care. National control has been extended for the most important public treatments.
 Treatment of foreign patients can be refused for capacity, planning, and financial reasons. The principle of equal treatment does not apply in full but can be derogated from.
The derogations from internal market principles created by legislative politics matter in the subsequent implementation of the directive. The output of legislative politics matters to the extent to which patients will actually use the rules and thus the regulatory outcomes. In order to assess the impact of the directive we have to ask; how many patients have been reimbursed for treatment across borders according to the directive? Studies examining the implementation of the directive and its outcome so far demonstrates 
